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This paper investigates the in￿ uence of peers on criminal behavior, using original data I
collected by interviewing homeless people in Milan. Information on friends￿names was elicited,
which allows to map each respondent￿ s network. Each individual was also asked to report his
criminal status prior to becoming homeless. To estimate the causal e⁄ects of network size and
of the share of criminal friends on (subsequent) criminal behavior, I rely on two instruments.
The ￿rst is the share of rainy days since the individual has become homeless: rainfall fosters
concentration of homeless individuals in sheltered places and increases the probability of meet-
ings. The second instrument is the fraction of inmates released by Milan￿ s authorities during
one￿ s period as homeless, which a⁄ects the supply of criminal potential friends. I ￿nd that the
probability of arrest decreases by 16 percentage points with the network size, but it increases
by 20 percentage points with the share of criminal friends in the group.
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1"A closed door may make feel you safe, but an open
door may save your life. Let￿ s open the doors!￿
Ambrogio, Homeless in Milan
1 Introduction
Homelessness is a critical problem among the urban poor. Their extreme social exclusion and isolation
reinforce the role of peers in shaping individual behavior. Among homeless people, peers are the main
source of information about potential jobs, shelter locations and welfare programs and they might
also provide informal insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. Randomized experiments in developing
countries also show that peers have a considerable in￿ uence on the decisions of the poorest.1
Peer e⁄ects have been widely documented in many contexts, from educational choices to labor
market outcomes. The role of social interactions is particularly important in the criminal sector,
where informal networks compensate for the lack of formal institutions in gaining knowledge and
criminal skills.2 However, the empirical evidence documenting causal e⁄ects of peer behavior on
individual criminal decisions is not convincing. The main di¢ culties are related to endogenous group
formation - to the extent that unobservable characteristics a⁄ecting the network￿ s composition are
likely to be correlated with unobservables in￿ uencing the decision to engage in crime - and re￿ ection
- since in a peer group everyone￿ s behavior a⁄ects the others￿behavior and it is problematic to
disentangle the individual￿ s behavior from that of the reference group (Manski, 1993). Finally, the
scarcity of individual data publicly available on social interactions limits the identi￿cation of network
boundaries only at a quite aggregate level, potentially leading to attenuation bias from measurement
errors (Kling, Ludwig, Katz, 2005).
The goal of this paper is to estimate the causal impact of peer characteristics and of network
size on criminal behavior among the homeless. Speci￿cally, it addresses the following questions: how
does individual criminal behavior change with peer characteristics? Is criminal behavior in￿ uenced
by the size of one￿ s social network? I test these questions using an original survey I conducted
by interviewing homeless people in Italy. Investigating the reasons for criminal acts is particularly
1For example, Bobonis and Finan (2009) study neighborhood e⁄ects on children￿ s school enrollment using experi-
mental evidence from the Mexican PROGRESA program. They found that peers have a considerable in￿ uence on the
enrollment decisions of children from poorer households. Godlonton and Thornton (2010) suggest that peer e⁄ects in
learning HIV results might be stronger in rural settings where other forms of communication (such as television, radio
or newspaper) are more limited.
2The concept that criminal behavior is a learned behavior has been emphasized by Sutherland (1947) and, sub-
sequently highlighted, among others, by Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009); Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004);
Case and Katz (2001); Cook and Gross (1996); Glaeser, Sacerdote and Sheinkman (1996); Kling and Ludwig (2007).
2interesting among the homeless. In the last few years, the face of homelessness has changed substan-
tially from the classical stereotype. Homeless people represent, on average, a group of urban poor
who simultaneously experienced economic or family related shocks, or former middle class and busi-
ness owners who can no longer meet their ￿nancial obligations. This creates a population forced to
live in poverty-stricken conditions, where criminal behaviors became over-represented because they
perceived bene￿ts outweigh the cost of potential punishment (Becker, 1968).
The novelty of the paper is two-fold. First, the data come from the ￿rst representative survey in
Europe among the homeless, collected by the author in January 2008 in Milan, Italy. The survey is
particularly suitable to study peer e⁄ects because it includes names and surnames of each respondent
and those of their ￿ve best homeless friends. Thus, I am able to construct the geometric structure of
the friendship networks and to precisely identify a close set of individual￿ s peer group. Information is
also available on each respondent￿ s criminal status prior to becoming homeless. The analysis is based
on 561 sheltered and unsheltered homeless individuals interviewed in one single night, with a high
proportion of former inmates in the sample (29.6%). Second, the paper estimates the causal e⁄ects of
network size and of the share of criminal friends on (subsequent) criminal behavior in a way that deals
with the non-random matching of individuals to their peers. Speci￿cally, the identi￿cation strategy
exploits two instruments. The ￿rst one is the share of rainy days during one￿ s period as homeless
to instrument the network size: rainfall fosters concentration of homeless people in sheltered places
(i.e. bridges, underground, train stations) and increases the probability of meetings. The second
instrument is the share of inmates released by Milan￿ s authorities during one￿ s homeless window
and it is used to correct for the self-selection of past criminals and potential criminals in the same
network.
To motivate the empirical analysis, the paper o⁄ers a simple theoretical framework to model the
choice between committing or not committing a crime, depending on the fraction of criminal friends
and on the total number of friends in the network. The model shows that it exists a unique equilibrium
where the individual probability to commit a crime is equal to the fraction of criminal friends in the
group. The theoretical framework provides testable predictions for the empirical section.
I start the empirical analysis by investigating the e⁄ect of the network size, measured by the
number of best friends, and the role of peers, captured by the share of friends who have already been
in prison before homelessness, on the individual probability of imprisonment during homelessness: I
consider the di⁄erent timing of imprisonment between the respondent and his friends (during and
before being homeless, respectively) to disentangle the direction of causality from peers to individual￿ s
3behavior. Following Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009), I assume that peer e⁄ects operate through
the in￿ uence of peer characteristics. To address the endogeneity in the number of friends, I instrument
the size of the network with the fraction of rainy days in one￿ s period as homeless. Rainfall shocks
randomly allocate individuals on the street, causing concentration in sheltered places (i.e. bridges,
underground, train stations) and a consequent higher probability of new friendships. Indeed, changes
in the fraction of rainy days strongly and positively predict the number of friends. Ceteris paribus,
a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of rainy days during one￿ s period as homeless is
associated with having 0.33 more friends. The key identi￿cation assumption here is that the fraction
of rainy days in one￿ s period as homeless does not directly in￿ uence the probability of imprisonment.
Detailed checks for the validity of the exclusion restriction are provided in the paper. To correct
for the self-selection of past criminals and potential criminals in the same network, I instrument the
share of criminal peers in an individual￿ s social network with the fraction of inmates released by
Milan￿ s authorities during one￿ s period as homeless. In this case, the underlying assumption is that
exogenous policies driving inmates￿out￿ ow increase the supply of criminal potential friends, without
directly a⁄ecting individual criminal behavior. Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase
in the number of inmates released increases the share of criminal peers by 3.9 percentage points.
Di⁄erent dates of arrival on the street provide the necessary individual variation in the instruments
used, which is plausibly as good as random.
Based on the instrumental variable estimates, the likelihood of imprisonment during a homeless
window decreases by 16 percentage points on average with an additional friend. The interpretation of
this ￿nding is consistent with the notion that friends represent a source of mutual insurance. Homeless
individuals with more friends have greater chances to survive on the street without committing crime
because their idiosyncratic shocks are shared among a higher number of individuals. Results also
indicate the presence of signi￿cant peer e⁄ects in the probability to commit criminal acts: a one
standard deviation increase in the share of peers who served previous jail sentence increases the
probability of incarceration for an individual with no prior criminal experience by 20 percentage
points.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on social
networks and crime and provides a background on the data collected among homeless people. In
section 3, a simple theoretical framework is o⁄ered to highlight the relationship between individual
criminal behavior, criminal friends and network size. Section 4 describes the research design for the
data collection and section 5 illustrates data and descriptive statistics. In section 6, I present the
4identi￿cation strategy. Sections 7-8 show the main results and robustness checks, section 9 concludes
and presents some policy recommendations.
2 Background
2.1 Previous works on social networks
This paper ￿ts into the literature investigating the role of social interactions in shaping individual
criminal behavior.3 Starting from Sutherland (1947), criminological and economic studies recognized
the potential channels through which peers may in￿ uence criminal activity: by sharing information
(Calv￿-Armengol and Zenou, 2004), by recruiting young criminals (Reiss, 1988), by transferring skills
or by creating a sense of invulnerability (Glaeser et al. 1996), by a⁄ecting the social stigma associated
with the illegal act (Cook and Gross, 1996). However, few papers have been convincing in measuring
the causal impact of peers on individual criminal decision.
There are major di¢ culties in estimating the in￿ uence of social interactions on criminal behav-
ior. First, the scarcity of individual data publicly available limits the identi￿cation of social network
boundaries at the aggregate level. Several contributions study neighborhood e⁄ects on criminal
acts. Case and Katz (1991) ￿nd that residence in a neighborhood where 10% more of the youth are
involved in crime raises the individual￿ s probability to become a delinquent by 2.3%. Subsequent
research examines the role of neighborhoods in predicting criminal activities, by relying on partic-
ular randomized events (Katz, Kling, Leibman, 2001; Ludwig, Duncan and Hirsch￿eld 2001; Kling,
Ludwig and Katz, 2005; Kling and Ludwig, 2007). Glaeser et al. (1996) provide an index to measure
the importance of social interactions in crime across cities in US and they found that the amount
of social interactions changes depending on the severity of crime. More recent literature considers
correctional facility boundaries to study peer e⁄ects on post released behavior. Bayer et al. (2009)
analyze the in￿ uence that juvenile o⁄enders serving time in the same correctional facility has on each
other￿ s subsequent criminal behavior. However, being part of the same neighborhood or of the same
correctional facility does not necessarily imply social interactions among these individuals. On this
respect, the data collected for the present paper are unique, since I am able to delineate a close set
3The in￿ uence of peers has been widely documented in many other contexts. Among others, peer e⁄ects on
educational outcomes have been studied by Sacerdote (2001), Calv￿-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009); on
educational choices by De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010); on productivity at the workplace by Mas and Moretti
(2009), Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010); on labor market outcomes by Munshi (2003), Beaman (2008); on welfare
participation by Bertrand, Luttmer, Mullainathan (2000); on technology adoption by Bandiera, Rasul (2006), Conley,
Udry (2010).
5of individual￿ s peer group, identi￿ed by actual friends￿nomination.4
The other di¢ culties in identifying the e⁄ect of social interactions are related to endogeneity - to
the extent that unobservable characteristics a⁄ecting the likelihood to have a friend are likely to be
correlated with unobservables in￿ uencing the decision to engage in crime (i.e. peers self-selection and
common group e⁄ects) - and re￿ ection - since in a peer group everyone￿ s behavior a⁄ects the others￿
behavior and it is problematic to disentangle individual￿ s behavior from the one of the reference
group (Manski, 1993). To address this issue, recent research has relied on a speci￿c randomized
social experiment, the Moving To Opportunity in Boston, which randomly allocates housing vouchers
from high to low poverty neighborhoods to examine the impact of newly allocated neighborhoods
on criminal activities. Although the randomization present in these experiments is ideal, relying
exclusively on such events severely limits the setting where peer e⁄ects can be studied (Bayer et al.,
2009). By including facility and facility-by-prior-o⁄ense ￿xed e⁄ects to control for the non-random
assignment to facilities, Bayer et al. (2009) ￿nd that peers, with a history of committing a particular
crime, increase the probability that an individual who has already committed the same type of crime
recidivates with that crime. In contrast, there is no evidence of such peer e⁄ects for individuals
with no prior experience in a given crime category. In this paper, I propose an instrumental variable
identi￿cation strategy, by relying on individual exogenous variation provided by di⁄erent dates of
arrival on the street/shelter.
Furthermore, prior empirical research mainly tests the role of criminal peers on individual criminal
behavior, while the e⁄ect of the total network size has been overlooked. Using the total number of
nominated friends as a proxy for the size of the social network, this paper investigates whether
individuals in larger or smaller networks are more or less likely to commit illegal o⁄enses.
2.2 Review of the existing data collection
Homelessness is a public policy issue in many countries. However, the lack of reliable data has limited
economic research and e⁄ective strategies to prevent and reduce the phenomenon. So far, only a few
countries include o¢ cial statistics on homelessness in the general population census or have developed
ad hoc methodologies and procedures to regularly count homeless people. In the US, the institution
that regularly carries out counts of homeless individuals is the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Since 1984, the HUD requires counts of this population every two years on a
4In the economic literature, only a few surveys recorded information on individual￿ s or household￿ s social networks,
based on friends￿nomination: the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012);
a panel household survey conducted in Tanzania (Dercon and De Weerdt, 2006; De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011); a
survey data from rural Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2006).
6national sample of 80 communities in di⁄erent geographical areas. The HUD￿ s most recent estimates
indicate 754,000 persons in the US living in emergency shelters, transitional housing, and on the street
on any given night. For the ￿rst time in 1990, the US Census Bureau included in the Decennial Census
the collection of data on homeless people into the general population census in ￿ve US Cities (Chicago,
Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York and Phoenix). Up to now, o¢ cial countrywide data are not
available for Europe, but, in a few countries, counts of homeless population have been conducted
by local agencies or NGOs. Besides the Milan Homeless Survey (MHS) conducted by the author
in January 2008, in Italy only two other attempts have been made to carry out a data collection
on homeless people. The ￿rst survey was jointly led by the Commission on Social Exclusion at the
Ministry of Social A⁄airs, and the Padua Zancan Foundation. This survey was aimed at delineating
the characteristics of people without a dwelling and to estimate their number throughout the entire
national territory. The ￿nal ￿gure accounts for a population of 17,000 homeless people in Italy, with
a higher concentration in the bigger municipalities. At a regional level, in Veneto, the University of
Padua and the Regional Observatory for the Protection and Promotion of the Person conducted a
survey in seven Italian cities in December 2004, on a sample of about 140 homeless people in shelters
and on the street, with the aim of gathering their socio-demographic characteristics.
Research on homelessness mainly analyzes the causes of the substantial increase in the incidence
of homelessness during 1980s in the US, using data provided by the HUD (Quigley et al., 2001; Honig
and Filer, 1993; O￿Flaherty, 1996; Quigley, Raphael and Smolenski, 2001) or by the US Census Bu-
reau (Burt, 1990). A common result among these studies is that variation in homelessness arises from
changed circumstances in the housing market and in the income distribution. Speci￿cally, tougher
housing markets are positively associated with higher levels of homelessness. While previous works
used intercity aggregate data, this is the ￿rst paper using micro-level data to study homelessness from
an economic perspective. Another strand of the literature investigates homelessness duration and
it underlines that homeless population experiences temporary but recurrent spells of homelessness
(Piliavin, Wright, Mare and Westerfelt, 1994). Homeless spells are generally longer for those with
history both of drugs and alcohol abuse, while having received government bene￿ts in the past seems
to have a controversial e⁄ect on the average length of a homeless spell (Allgood and Warren, 2003;
Braga and Corno, forthcoming).
73 A simple theoretical framework
The goal of this section is to provide testable predictions on the impact of peers a⁄ecting the in-
dividual decision to commit a crime. I investigate how homeless individuals react to an exogenous
change in the number of friends and in the fraction of criminal friends.
Consider a continuum of individuals. Individuals are randomly connected in a network of social
interactions. Suppose that in each network, a fraction ￿ is criminal and the reminder fraction 1 ￿ ￿
is non-criminal. This fraction is assumed to be equal to the fraction of criminals in the general
population. We assume that individuals randomly become friends to any other individuals in the
network, who can be criminal or not. Ni represents the total number of friends for the individual i
and the number of criminal friends, Ni;CR; is given by:
Ni;CR = ￿Ni
The total number of non-criminal friends, Ni;NCR, is then de￿ned as:
Ni;NCR = (1 ￿ ￿)Ni
Each agent bears a cost of committing a crime, C. This cost is negatively correlated with ￿;
the fraction of criminal friends: (i) in a network of criminals, each person can exert less criminal
e⁄ort for the same criminal payo⁄ compared to operating alone; (ii) criminals share their knowledge
about delinquent behavior between their friends and since there are no formal ways of learning how
to become a criminal, the most e¢ cient way is through criminal friends. To become a criminal, a
person must also be inclined toward illegal activity (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). Thus, suppose
that the Nature draws for each agent a propensity to commit a crime ￿i 2 R+ from a CDF F with
continuos density. I assume that the agent￿ s realization of ￿i is his private information. The cost of
committing a crime C; is negatively correlated with the individual criminal propensity, ￿i. A higher
￿i means a lower psychological cost to commit illegal acts.
Following the seminal work of Becker (1968), I assume that individuals trade o⁄ the costs and
bene￿ts of delinquent activities to take their decision between committing or not committing a crime.
A person commits an o⁄ense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using
his time in other activities. The expected utility from committing crime is:
8EUi;CR = pU(Arrest) + (1 ￿ p)U(NonArrest) ￿ C(￿;￿i)
where p is the probability of conviction and it depends only on the level of police e¢ ciency.
As explained above, the cost of committing crimes, C; is negatively correlated with the fraction of
criminal friends, ￿ : C￿ = @C
@￿ 0 0 and with the criminal propensity, ￿i; so that C￿i = @C
@￿i 0 0.
Furthermore, assume that C￿￿ = @C
@￿ > 0 and C￿￿i = @C
@￿@￿i < 0:5 The expected utility from non
committing a crime is equal to the outside option:
Ui;NCR = Wo(Ni);
where the total number of friends, Ni positively a⁄ects Ui;NCR: It follows that
@Ui;NCR
@Ni > 0:
The key idea behind this assumption is the plausible presence of a mutual insurance among
friends. Friends help to smooth income shocks by transferring resources after the shock is realized.
For example, it is plausible that not all the homeless in the same group have a job at the same
time. Having idiosyncratic risk creates solidarity mechanisms. Thus, risk-sharing bene￿ts depend
positively on the number of total friends Ni: 6
De￿nition 1: An individual commit a crime if and only if
EUi;CR ￿ Ui;NCR
that is when:
pU(Arrest) + (1 ￿ p)U(NonArrest) ￿ C(￿;￿i) ￿ Wo(Ni):






pU(Arrest) + (1 ￿ p)U(NonArrest) ￿ C(￿;
￿
￿) = Wo(Ni): (1)
From equation (1), we can evaluate a change in the decision to be involved in criminal activities
in response to an increase in the total number of friends, Ni and to an increase in the fraction of
5Such conditions are made for convenience since they guarantee a unique equilibrium, without a⁄ecting the relative
comparative static.
6Similarly, BramoullØ and Kranton (2007) build a theoretical model of risk sharing between pairs of agents where
the risk sharing bene￿ts depend on the number of agents in each village.




































These results drive to the following predictions:
Prediction 1: An increase in the fraction of criminal friends ￿ will decrease
￿
￿: A lower threshold,
￿
￿; has the e⁄ect of reducing the cost of crime, and consequently to increase the expected utility of
committing a crime. This implies that the probability to commit a crime increases with a higher
share of criminal friends in the network.
Prediction 2: An increase in the total number of friends, Ni will increase
￿
￿ . In this case, a higher
threshold,
￿
￿; has the e⁄ect of increasing the cost of crime, and consequently to decrease the expected
utility of committing a crime. This implies that the probability to commit a crime decreases with a
higher number of friends.
The proportion of individuals with ￿i >
￿
￿; who will then choose to commit a crime, is given by
1 ￿ F(
￿
￿(￿;Ni))7. The equilibrium of the model is then:
Pr(￿i >
￿
￿) = 1 ￿ F(
￿
￿(￿;Ni)) = ￿:
The existence of an equilibrium follows directly from the Brouwer￿ s Fixed Point Theorem. To see
that this point is necessarily unique, let g(￿) = 1￿F(
￿
￿(￿;Ni)) and consider the sign of the ￿rst and
the second derivatives. Di⁄erentiating g(￿); we get: g￿ = ￿F￿
￿
￿









0.8 This implies that g(￿) = 1 ￿ F(
￿
￿(￿;Ni)) crosses g(￿) = ￿ only in one point and that point is
unique.
7This result is closely related to a recent work by Anwar and Fang (2006), developed in the literature on racial bias
in motor vehicle searches.
8The second derivative of
￿











104 Survey design and data
4.1 A survey among the homeless
The data used in this paper come from an innovative and representative survey among homeless
people, managed by the author in January 2008 in Milan, Italy. The project involved about 350
volunteers, recruited among service providers to the homeless, but also among students and private
citizens, thanks to the substantial interest received by the project from local media and newspapers.
A survey among homeless people involves many challenges. First, it is di¢ cult to clearly de￿ne the
target population. Our reference population includes all persons who reside in (i) places not meant
for human habitation, such as cars, parks, sidewalks, abandoned buildings (unsheltered homeless);
(ii) emergency shelters (sheltered homeless); (iii) people living in disused areas/shacks/slums.9 The
second challenge arises since it is very di¢ cult to provide reliable estimates on the number of homeless
individuals in a city and to conduct an accurate survey. The Milan Homeless Survey 2008 (MHS
2008) includes two major phases: 1) a point-in-time count; and 2) a comprehensive survey via trained
interviews.
The Point in time survey or the S - Night approach (Shelter and Street Night) aims at identifying
the number of homeless sleeping on the street, in shelters and in slums contemporaneously in one
reference night in the whole town. As such, it ensures a minimal double counting. Homeless people
are indeed both territorially mobile and likely to enter into and exit out of the homeless state, and
the risk to count and to interview the same person twice is therefore very high.10 Our reference night
for the count was January 14th, 2008. The main drawback of the point-in-time method is the risk
of missing homeless hidden from public view during late-night hours. We applied some e⁄orts to
overcome this criticism and to have the most reliable estimate. We divided Milan into 65 smaller
areas, following the main roads, so that a team of 3-4 enumerators could reasonably cover them
during the night of the count. Surveyors were asked to walk every street and other public places
in their assigned area. To reduce the risk of skipping some streets, we provided the enumerators
9The third category represents a very peculiar feature of the Italian context and refers to illegal settlements which are
mostly inhabited by (irregular) immigrants and gypsies. The choice to include them in our de￿nition of homelessness
was motivated by the fact that these arrangements can be classi￿ed as inadequate or insecure housing situations.
10Among the most recent approach proposed to count the homeless population, is the capture-recapture method.
This method calculates the total homeless population from the sum of the population actually observed and an
estimate of the unobserved population, by calculating the number of people not caught in either sample. A limitation
of this method consists in estimating the homeless population during an entire year. Therefore, it assumes that all
individuals identi￿ed as homeless remain homeless for the full year (Fisher et al. 1994). Brent (2007) and Braga and
Corno (forthcoming) provide a detailed overview of di⁄erent methods used to count homeless populations.
11with enlarged maps of their target area, and we de￿ned in advance the itinerary to be followed,
by writing down the complete list of all streets in each area. We established some criteria for the
count: closed tents and closed paperboard dwellings have been counted as for one homeless person,
while for abandoned cars/caravans enumerators tried to understand how many persons were sleeping
there. To be sure all enumerators started the count at the same time, they met one hour before
the kick-o⁄ in ￿ve strategic places. There, they also collected useful materials for the night (i.e.
torches, food, beverages and notebooks). Besides counting, volunteers have two additional tasks: (i)
to report a homeless person￿ s location as precisely as possible, by describing the road, the closest
civic number but also the sleeping place (i.e. Sarfatti road close to number 25 on a bench in front of
Bocconi University); (ii) to detect some observable characteristics, such as the ethnic group, gender
and estimated age: this was a key information to test for a potential sample selection. Volunteers
paired these statistical activities with hot beverages and food distribution.
In the meantime, a team of volunteers collected information on the number, names, gender, age
and nationality of the homeless living in the emergency shelters in the city.
The procedure for counting people living in slums was not straightforward. Slums in Milan are
settlements made by prefabricated materials or set up in disused barracks, where people (mainly
gypsies) are generally monitored by the municipal police. During the three months prior to the
survey, project leaders visited the slums in the target group, to identify the typology of the village
(authorized/unauthorized), the type of ethnic group and the number of people living in each area.
During the ￿eld visits, we asked for the permission to interview people in the slums and we announced
the date of the survey. On the night of the count, enumerators only checked dimensions and locations
of pre-identi￿ed slums. The average duration of the count was about 3 hours, from 10 pm. to 1 am.
The count was necessary to have a precise idea on the phenomenon￿ s dimension and to construct a
census from which we randomly selected a sample of respondents. Questionnaires to the unsheltered
homeless were performed on the following night, January 15th, while we surveyed people who were
sleeping in shelters and in slums on January 16th and 19th, respectively.11 12 The whole data collection
was then completed in a single week to minimize sample attrition. The survey involved a total of 75
interviewers out of 350 volunteers. To minimize answer bias, we intensively trained the interviewers
and we recruited the same interviewers for all the three nights. On the street, we tried to have the full
census of the homeless counted by sending back enumerators to the locations identi￿ed during the
11Interviews in slums have been done on Saturday afternoon. We decided not to go in slums during the night for
security reasons.
12The questionnaire is available upon request.
12count. Sheltered homeless were randomly sampled from the population on the basis of the shelter￿ s
dimension. We created a random sample proportional to the shelter dimension by over-sampling small
shelters and under-sampling big shelters. We agreed in advance on the best time to run interviews
with each shelter￿ s manager. Among 25 shelters, four refused to participate and one had no guests at
the time of the survey. Some interviews were conducted directly by shelter managers. Finally, slums
were sampled through a strati￿ed random sample method, based on geographic location, typology
and dimension. More speci￿cally, we strati￿ed them accordingly to city administrative division (9
areas), o¢ cial area classi￿cation (authorized/unauthorized, shacks, abandoned buildings) and area￿ s
dimension.13 We selected a total of 12 out of 56 slums. Within each selected area, we randomly
extracted respondents. During the interviews, volunteers also distributed napkins and kids￿clothes
to the households in the slums. To preserve enumerators￿safety, we informed the police about the
initiative without directly involve it.
A potential drawback in doing the count and the interviews on two di⁄erent days (even if in
very close proximity) is the attrition rate, since people counted could have moved the day after. To
control for the fact that the homeless counted were the same as those interviewed, we included as
the ￿rst question in the survey "Did you sleep here last night?" and if no "Where did you sleep?".
We cross checked this information with the homeless locations recorded during the count.
Self-reported answers can be biased for many reasons. This might be particularly true with
surveys among homeless people: they can be drunk during the survey and they are more likely to
be mentally ill compared to the general population. To address this drawback, we asked to the
enumerators from the Red Cross to ￿ll up a one page questionnaire regarding respondent￿ s condition
at the end of the survey. We did not consider questionnaires conducted with drunk or mentally-ill
homeless persons (2%). As incentive, enumerators distributed grocery vouchers to the respondents
who fully completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was written in Italian and translated into
Romanian and English. The average time for an interview was about 30 minutes.
The count and the interviews were not conducted on the same day for two main reasons. First,
it is not feasible to interview people during a one-night count. During the count, enumerators
minutely checked the presence of homeless by walking along all streets in Milan and there would
not be remaining time to also select and interview them. Second, while it is optimal to conduct
a late-night count (from around midnight to 3 a.m.) to maximize the probability to observe more
13Slum￿ s dimension was classi￿ed as follows: "small" if inhabitants numbered less than 30, "medium" if inhabitants
numbered between 30 and 100, "big" if inhabitants numbered more than 100.
13visible people sleeping outside, the ideal time for interviews is around 9 p.m. when they are already
settled down, but still awake and able to talk. The survey took place in January when the average
daily temperature is the lowest in Milan and shelters are likely to be at peak capacity: it is easier
to count people in shelters than on the street and conducting the count on a night when shelters
are most full will likely lead to the most accurate count. Counting and interviewing people sleeping
in open locations during the winter months may also lead to a more realistic picture of chronically
unsheltered homeless. Furthermore, to facilitate the identi￿cation of homeless people and to reduce
the likelihood of the surveyors being overwhelmed by potential respondents, we chose a day of the
week with less pedestrian tra¢ c (Monday night).
4.2 Additional Data Sources
The paper exploits two additional data sources. First, I use rainfall data to proxy the size of the
friendship network. Rainfall data come from the Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection
(ARPA) and from the Meteorological Department of the Military Aeronautics. Daily rainfall data
has been collected from 1960 to 2008. I use information on rainfall from six weather stations within
Milan municipality, but some stations lack data for some days per month.14 I calculate the average
number of rainy days among weather stations as a proxy for daily rainfall in Milan.15
Second, I assembled administrative data on inmates from the Statistical O¢ ces of the three
correctional facilities in Milan.16 Speci￿cally, these data include the number of criminals arrested
and released, and the fraction of inmates without a residence at the moment of the arrest, by month
from 1993 to 2008.17 To proxy the number of inmates released in Milan, I compute the monthly sum
of inmates released among correctional facilities.
5 Descriptive statistics
The population of homeless in Milan accounts for 3860 homeless: 408 unsheltered homeless, 1152
sheltered homeless and about 2300 adults (older than 16 years old) in slums. This approximately
represents 0.3% of the total population in Milan.
[Insert table 1]
14The six weather stations in Milan are located in Lambrate, Parco Nord, Zavattari, Confalonieri, Juvara, Brera.
15As de￿ned by the ARPA, a rainy day records at least one millimeter of rainfall during 24 hours.
16There are three correctional facilities in Milan: S. Vittore, Opera, Bollate.
17Data on inmates arrested and released in Bollate are available only from 2000, when this correctional facility was
open.
14Table 1 shows the percentage of those who did not participate in the survey, by place of interview.
Among the homeless counted on the street on January 14th 2008, we interviewed about 34.6%, 12%
refused to answer, 16.4% were already sleeping at the time of the interview and 21% were not found.
Due to time constraints, we did not send enumerators in 16% of the identi￿ed locations.18 In shelters,
we randomly sampled 500 individuals out of 1152 and we interviewed 420 of them. While 6.7% of the
sample was not in the shelters on the day of the interview, 7.3% was not interviewed for lack of time
and about 2% refused to answer. In slums, we randomly selected a sample of 525 individuals out of
2300 and we surveyed 66.5% of the sample, but we did not conduct the questionnaire for about 33.5%
of the respondents for lack of time. None among the slum dwellers refused to participate. We dropped
a small fraction of bad quality questionnaires, in which the enumerators reported respondents with
mental disorders or alcohol-related problems (0.02%). We gathered a ￿nal sample of 910 observations.
This paper focuses on street and sheltered homeless, ending up with 561 observations.19 To have a
better insight on the magnitude of a possible sample selection, I compare data on gender and age
of the homeless counted with those of the homeless actually interviewed. The percentage of women
interviewed is exactly equal to the percentage of women in the total homeless population (10%) and
the percentage of homeless older than 35 years is very similar considering the sample or the total
population (72.1% versus 72.4 %). This comparison provides some con￿dence about the random
nature of the sample we are analyzing.20
The most common nationalities in the sample are Italians (44.3%), Moroccans (16.52%), Roma-
nians (11.6%) and Egyptians (3.57%).
[Insert ￿gure 1]
Figure 1 reports the spatial distribution of street homeless and shelters￿location in Milan. We
found a high concentration of street homeless in the centre of the city, in the proximity of train
stations (Cadorna Station and Central Station) and at Linate￿ s airport, where every night usually
about 15-20 people are sleeping. However, from the inspection of the spatial distribution it emerges
that street homeless are almost equally spread within the city. As shown in ￿gure 1, in Milan there
are 25 shelters, mainly located in the suburbs.
18For example, we decided not to send enumerators in locations recorded as "places with paperboards or abandoned
cars, but without individuals".
19People who live in slums have a social network structure not comparable with the one of the homeless who live on
the street and in shelters. Their social network is mainly represented by the family members they live with. Therefore,
I did not include them in the analysis.
20Unfortunately, there is no formal way to test a potential sample selection of non-criminal homeless. Criminal
homeless might be less likely to participate in the survey. An argument against this hypothesis it that enumerators
were Red Cross volunteers in uniform, a clear sign that the survey was totally unrelated to the police.
15A ￿rst relevant question to answer is: what are the main reasons driving people living on the
street? Some of them, such as unemployment and poverty, can be predictable, but others are less
intuitive. Results shows that about 33% of immigrants and 24% of Italians cite unemployment as the
main cause of their homelessness, either because they lost a job or because they cannot ￿nd a job. A
breakdown in family relationships, such as a divorce or a death in the family is the main reason for
about 36% of Italians, suggesting that family is an important source of insurance against economic
and psychological shocks. For foreigners, the second most widespread reason is immigration: at
the beginning of their stay in the host country, immigrants have problems related to their limited
language pro￿ciency, their scarce knowledge of the Italian welfare system, the labor and the housing
markets. Among the other reasons, 9.7% report drug or alcohol abuse and 7% cite previous conviction
(not displayed).21
[Insert ￿gure 2]
A key feature of the data is that each respondent reports di⁄erent date of arrival on the street/shelter
(day/month/year) and, consequently, di⁄erent length of their homeless spell.22 Figure 2 reports the
number of homeless people interviewed by the date of arrival (month/year) on the street or in shelter.
The average duration of a homeless spell is about 5 years, 7 years for individuals interviewed on the
street and about 4 years for those in emergency shelters. The respondent with the longest homeless
window has arrived on the street for the ￿rst time in 1960.
[Insert table 2]
A section of the questionnaire also investigates their sources of income. Table 2 contains infor-
mation on the fraction of homeless who declares to have an income, by type of source. The ￿rst
column shows the ￿gures considering the whole sample of street and sheltered homeless. About 13%
of respondents do not have any income. Government subsidies (welfare check, unemployment bene-
￿ts, disability insurance, pension) together account for about 13.6% and, as expected, this fraction is
higher for the Italians.23 The fraction of homeless who declares earned income (from permanent and
occasional jobs) accounts for about 30% of the sample, suggesting a surprisingly high percentage of
21For a detailed discussion about the characteristics of the homeless population in Milan see Braga and Corno
(forthcoming).
22The length of a homeless spell is computed by taking the di⁄erence in months between the date of the ￿rst time
an individual slept on the street/shelter and the date of the survey. In an ideal setting, I would use the date of exit
from the homeless status to calculate the end of the homeless spell. Unfortunately, it was impossible to recruit for the
survey former homeless people.
23To be eligible for welfare checks, individuals must be Italian and resident in Italy, while regular immigrants can
bene￿t from pension, disability and unemployment insurance if they meet the eligibility requirements.
16homeless in the labor force. In line with the statistics reporting a breakdown in family relationships
as the main cause of homelessness, only about 11% of respondents receive money transfers from fam-
ily and friends, 14.4% among the immigrants and about 6.8% among the Italians. Table 2 reports
that only a few people declare to gain from illegal activities.
[Insert table 3]
However, by investigating criminal behavior from a di⁄erent perspective, the Milan Homeless
Survey 2008 highlights a strong relationship between homelessness and crime. Speci￿cally, the survey
investigates whether the respondent has ever been in prison and if this happens before or/and after
he slept on the street/shelter for the ￿rst time.24 As reported in table 3, 29.6% of the homeless have
been in prison at least once (38.2% of Italians and 21.5% of immigrants). Roughly, 9% declare a
period in prison before being homeless, 1.8% went to prison before and during their homelessness
and almost 19% have been arrested only during their period as homeless, showing how in extreme
poor conditions, crime could become more frequent. Following Locher and Moretti (2004), I use the
likelihood of imprisonment as a proxy for criminal behavior throughout the analysis, assuming that a
person￿ s probability of conviction is an increasing function of the number of o⁄enses he commits. A
limitation of the survey is that it does not elicit information on when the crime was committed and
on the type of criminal o⁄enses. To have some insights on the type of crime generally committed by
homeless people, I assembled administrative data from correctional facilities in Milan on the criminal
acts committed by the inmates who declared "missing residence" when arrested. Typically, these are
burglary, robbery, felony and misdemeanor drug o⁄enses, followed by realization of false identi￿cation
documents and o⁄enses related to prostitution.25
[Insert table 4]
The key questions for the identi￿cation of peers in the paper are the following: "Do you know
other people who sleep on the street? If yes, how many?" and "Of these, could you please tell
me the name and surname (or alternatively, the ￿rst three letters of the surname) of the ￿rst ￿ve
friends on whom do you rely on in case of need?￿ . Approximately, 33% of the respondents knows
more than 20 homeless individuals. Table 4 reports the distribution of homeless friends, by place
24The exact question was "Have you ever been in prison?". If yes, "Have you been in prison before, after or before
and after you slept on the street/shelter for the ￿rst time?".
25In Italy, illegal immigrants apprehended by the police are not incarcerated. Indeed, the last reform on immigration
policy introduced the possibility of incarceration for illegal immigrants but such norm was never enforced because it
was deemed anticostitutional.
17of interview.26 27 About 36% of homeless people do not rely on any homeless friends and this
percentage is higher for people who slept in shelters during the night of the count. Each individual
has an average of 1.35 friends. 21% has one friend and only about 6% reports names and surnames
of ￿ve friends. Approximately, 11.4% of respondents refused to answer and this fraction is slightly
higher among sheltered homeless. The second part of table 4 contains analogous ￿gures for the
sample of inmates. There is no ex-ante di⁄erence in the distribution of friends among inmates
who have been in prison before being homeless and the one in the general sample (the test for the
equality of the coe¢ cients do not reject the null with a p-value of 0.621), while among those who
went to prison during homelessness, we note a higher fraction of respondents with less friends (the
test for the equality of the coe¢ cients rejects the null with a p-value of 0.001). Incarceration rates
are monotonically declining with the number of friends. Although this pattern does not necessarily
represent the causal e⁄ect of network size on the probability of incarceration, it provides a ￿rst piece
of evidence on the importance of friends in reducing the likelihood of imprisonment.
Another interesting point is to understand the length of a friendship and if two friends generally
arrive on the street at the same time. The MHS includes information on the time of knowledge of each
homeless friend. On average, respondents know their best friends since about 4 years. By looking at
the correlation between respondent0s duration on the street and his peers￿duration - extremely low
and not statistically signi￿cant - it emerges that friends arrived on the street for the ￿rst time at a
di⁄erent date, suggesting that they are not stuck with the friends they met in the ￿rst instance (not
displayed).
[Insert table 5]
Information on the name and surname of each respondent is also elicited. By matching friends￿
questionnaires with respondents￿questionnaires, I am able to obtain information on the character-
istics of the nominated friends. Names and surnames of respondents in shelters have been checked
with administrative data provided by shelters￿administration, while we consulted soup kitchens and
26To double check whether the names reported are actually related to homeless friends, I compared the period of
knowledge of each friend with the respondent￿ s duration on the street. The period of knowledge is always lower than
respondent￿ s duration, except for the case of two brothers and two spouses who nominated each other as friends.
27The survey did not elicit information on the name and the surname of non-homeless friends for two main reasons.
First, the sociological literature describes the homeless as the most excluded people in society (Jencks, 1994) who have
been abandoned by everyone, including friends, and have di¢ culties in building up pure relationships with people
who do not live on the street (Anderson and Snow, 1993). Hence, I assume the fraction of non-homeless friends to
be negligible. Second, analyzing relationships between homeless and non-homeless individuals would have implied
a survey among non-homeless friends to elicit their criminal behaviors and socio-economic characteristics. This was
beyond the scope of the paper.
18social service centres￿registers for unsheltered respondents￿names.28 Table 5 shows ￿gures on one￿ s
peers criminal behavior. The ￿rst part of the table provides a breakdown of the share of peers who
have been in prison before starting their homeless spell. I assume this share of peers to be equal
to zero if the respondent does not have peers who have been in prison before becoming homeless
or if he does not have any friends. 69.16% of homeless interviewed do not have peers with criminal
records before their ￿rst homeless spell or do not have friends. 3.03% of the respondents have a peer
group composed for one half by criminals, while more than 5% have only criminal friends. 19.25%
cited friends not in the sample or who did not answer to the question on their best friends or on
incarceration.29 To sum up, about 11.6% of the sample have at least one peer who have been in
prison before starting his homeless spell. The second part of table 5 reports the share of criminal
peers for the sample of inmates, to check whether inmates have a higher propensity to meet more
criminal friends. Inmates, both before and after being homeless, report, on average, a higher fraction
of criminal peers compared to the total sample, suggesting the importance of tackling criminals￿
self-selection in the same network.
6 Empirical strategy
The goal of this section is to assess whether the size of social networks and peer characteristics have
a role on one￿ s probability to be imprisoned. As explained earlier, the likelihood of imprisonment
is assumed to increase with the number of crimes committed and used as an imperfect proxy for
criminal behavior.30 I estimate the following speci￿cation:





+ zxi + ￿p + "i: (2)
The dependent variable, Pi; is a dummy equal to one if the individual i went to prison at least





is the fraction of i0s peers who went to prison before being homeless, where gi
28For example, to ￿nd respondent￿ s missing surnames (a small fraction of them declares only his/her name), I crossed
information on the name, age, nationality provided in the questionnaire with name, surname, age and nationality
coming from administrative data.
29The share of i￿ s criminal peers is computed by cross-reference the nominated friends in the sample. For example,
if the respondent cited the name of 4 friends but only 3 were in the sample and, among these, one individual went to
prison before homelessness, the fraction of i￿ s criminal peers is equal to 1
3: A potential concern arises: criminals might
be less likely to participate in the survey and thus, to be in the sample. In the above example, if the non-observed
friend would have been a criminal, the share of i￿ s criminal peers would have been equal to 2
4: This is an inescapable
limitation, but it implies an harmeless downward approximation of the average number of criminals in the sample.
30As noted in Cameroon and Trivedi (2005), measurement errors in the dependent variable may in￿ ate the standard
errors but do not lead to inconsistent estimates.
19represents i0s network and it includes all the nominated best friends. In this framework, peers are
individual-speci￿c. xi is a vector of individual￿ s traits, including age, age squared, a second order
polynomial in the length of the homeless spell, gender, education, nationality, as well as a dummy
variable equal to one if the individual i has already been in prison before becoming homeless: The
latter controls for the individual propensity to be criminal independently by the homeless status and
it guarantees that the e⁄ect of the covariates is studied on individuals with no prior homelessness
criminal experience. ￿p denotes place of interview ￿xed e⁄ects to adjust estimates for common
unobservable shocks a⁄ecting people who reside in the same shelter or in the same street. Peer
e⁄ects are measured by the parameters ￿ and ￿: Speci￿cally, ￿ captures the e⁄ect of the network size
on subsequent criminal behavior, while ￿ measures the impact of the fraction of criminal friends.31
The conjecture is ￿ < 0 and ￿ > 0: These predictions will be tested in table 7 below, and subjected
to a series of robustness tests.
In interpreting ￿ as social interaction e⁄ect, we are implicitly assuming that a potential peer
in￿ uences i￿ s criminal behavior because his imprisonment happened before the one of the respondent.
Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows all the possible scenarios for the existence of peer exposure and
the plausibly of this assumption is motivated and discussed in Section 7.
The estimation of equation (2) deserves further discussion. First, the number of friends, Ni; is
not exogenous, either due to omitted variable bias and to reverse causality. Some unobservables
a⁄ecting the probability of imprisonment might also a⁄ect the number of friends. For example, more
self-con￿dent individuals could be more involved in criminal activities, but they also might be more
likely to have more friends: in this case, the size of the social network will be almost certainly positive
correlated to the error term "i and conventional OLS estimates of the parameter ￿; will be biased
upward relative to the true causal e⁄ect. Or, alternatively, individuals arrested during their homeless
window could have a larger social network size because they met up friends in prison. In order to
correctly identify the causal impact of network size on imprisonment, it is necessary to identify an
instrument that is correlated with network size but uncorrelated to the error term, "i. I exploit the
variation in rainfall shocks during one￿ s period as homeless to instrument Ni as follows:
Ni = ￿ + ￿Raini + ￿Releasedi + zxi + ￿p + ui: (3)
31Equation (2) assumes that peer e⁄ects operate through the in￿ uence of peer characteristics (or exogenous e⁄ects
as de￿ned by Manski (1993)), such as criminal history, rather than peer behavior (or endogenous e⁄ects). Indeed, in
the context of criminal behaviors, the role of exogenous peer e⁄ects is easier to estimates and nevertheless crucial for
policy implications.
20Raini is the fraction of rainy days during i￿ s period on the street. Imagine that i arrived for
the ￿rst time on the street on July 13th; 2006: Raini is the ratio between the sum of the rainy days
from July 13th; 2006 and January 15th; 2008, the date of the survey, divided by the total number
of days between July 13th; 2006 and January 15th; 2008. The idea behind the instrument is that
homeless people are more likely to be in sheltered places during rainy days, such as bridges, porches or
recreational centers, and they have a higher likelihood to meet more people and to make more friends.
Hence, the prediction is ￿ > 0: The variation in the Raini variable comes from the di⁄erent date
(day/month/year) at which a given individual arrived on the street. The date of arrival is individual
speci￿c and it depends on economic and family related shocks during a person￿ s life, which is plausibly
as good as random. Those who arrived on the street for the ￿rst time in the same day, month and
year have the same fraction of rainy days. Before explaining the variable Releasedi, let￿ s analyze
potential concerns that could threat the validity of the instrument. The key identifying assumption
is that, conditional on other covariates, the fraction of rainy days in one￿ s period as homeless cannot
directly in￿ uence the probability of imprisonment during homelessness, but it is also not correlated
with any other (omitted) factors that could a⁄ect Pi: More formally, Cov (Raini;"ijxi) = 0.
On this respect, previous studies in criminology have examined the correlation between weather
and crime. This relationship appears to greatly vary with the weather condition (i.e. temperature,
rain, wind and humidity) and the type of crime examined (DeFronzo, 1979; Perry and Simpson, 1987;
Cohn, 1990). For example, assaults, burglary, collective violence, domestic violence, and rape tend to
increase with ambient temperature, at least up to about 85￿F. High temperatures do not appear to
be correlated with homicide, robbery, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. It is not currently possible to
draw any ￿rm conclusion about the relationship between cold temperatures and crime, rainfall and
crime, or wind and crime. In particular, the research on rain and crime suggests that rainfall does
not signi￿cantly in￿ uence homicide and rape, and the relationship between rain and property crime
is not clear. Although these studies do not allow for any unambiguous inferences about cause and
e⁄ect, they seem to suggest that high temperature, more than rainfall variability, might in￿ uence
the individual decision to commit a crime. In line with this hypothesis, in the economic literature,
Jacob, Lefgren and Moretti (2007) examine the short-run dynamics of criminal behavior by using
weather shocks, namely temperature and rainfall, to instrument the level of crimes in a jurisdiction:
their ￿ndings show that while temperature is strongly correlated with property crime, the coe¢ cient
on precipitation is not statistically signi￿cant.
Furthermore, in the setting of this paper and given the most common types of crimes committed
21by the homeless (i.e. property crimes), it is hard to think about any direct correlation between
an homeless￿ s decision to perform illegal o⁄enses and rainfall. For instance, if an homeless person
desperately needs money to buy food, he probably would commit an illegal act with and without
rainfall. On the other hand, rainfall would surely in￿ uence his decision to look for a sheltered place,
resulting in greater opportunities for social interactions.
To further rule out other potential concerns about the validity of the exclusion restriction, I
exploit two additional sources of data. First, I study the association between the monthly number
of individuals arrested and the average monthly number of rainy days in Milan from 1998 to 2007:
￿gures indicate a fairly low (.12) and not statistically signi￿cant pairwise correlation (p-value equal to
.17). This correlation remains not statistically signi￿cant also controlling for year dummies. Second,
I look at the crime reported by the police to the judiciary authority from 1983 to 2003 in Milan.
These statistics are published yearly by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and they
allow a disaggregation by provinces and by type of crime. The correlation between the number of
rainy days in each year and the yearly number of crimes reported in Milan is negative and equal to
-.28, but, once again, not statistically signi￿cant (p-value equal to .21). With the same source of
data, I focus on a series of crime categories that are most common among the homeless: property
crimes (burglary, robbery, common theft), drug-related crimes and o⁄enses related to prostitution:
the p-value, equal to .16, con￿rms a non-statistically signi￿cant correlation between the number of
rainy days and the number of crimes most commonly committed by homeless people.
A second concern related to the instrument validity is that rainfall may in￿ uence the intensity of
non-criminal activities, and therefore indirectly a⁄ects crime. For example, if rainfall a⁄ects income
for those who use to beg on the street, the criminal behavior of individual i may also be a⁄ected.32 In
table 2, we report evidence that none of the respondents declare begging as the ￿rst source of income
and only 0.21% declare begging as second source. Hence, the results do not change by estimating
equation (2) excluding individuals who use to beg.
Taken together, these pieces of evidence indicates that rainfall is unlikely to be directly correlated
with the probability of imprisonment or the error term and it is a valid candidate to instrument the
network size.
[Insert ￿gure 3]
32For example, there could be a negative relationship between income and rainfall if during rainy days the homeless
earn less money from begging due to less pedestrian tra¢ c, or a positive correlation if during rainy days the homeless
earn more money because they beg in shopping malls or in the underground.
22Another natural concern regarding the use of past values of rainfall as instrument is whether there
is su¢ cient variation in the rainfall to identify peer e⁄ects precisely. In other words, individuals who
entered in the homeless status many years ago might have very similar rainfall distributions, while
people who have not been homeless very long should be exposed to higher rainfall variation. In ￿gure
3, I plot the fraction of rainy days, by respondent￿ s duration on the street (in days). As expected,
the graph shows a higher variation in the instrument for individuals with shorter homelessness spells.
The spike in the fraction of rainy days for those who arrived on the street one or two months prior to
the survey captures the high quantity of rainfall during the winter months before January, the date
of the survey.33
A second problem in estimating equation (2) with a standard OLS model concerns the potential
sorting of past criminals and potential criminals in the same network. Individuals with a higher
propensity to commit illegal o⁄enses could be more likely to look for homeless friends with previous
criminal experience. To deal with this issue, I exploit the fraction of inmates released by Milan￿ s






= ￿ + ￿Releasedi + ￿Raini + zxi + ￿p + ui (4)
where Releasedi represents the fraction of inmates released from correctional facilities in Milan
during one￿ s period as homeless. More precisely, it is computed by dividing the number of released
inmates since person i ￿rst became homeless and the number of months person i has been homeless.34
The variation in the instrument is reported in Figure 3. Those who arrived on the street for the
￿rst time in the same month and year have the same fraction of inmates released. The idea behind
the instrument is that exogenous government policies driving inmates￿out￿ ow increase the supply
of criminal potential friends and, consequently, positively a⁄ect the likelihood to meet more criminal
peers. I rely on the assumption that the share of inmates released in a homeless spell is not directly
correlated with the probability to be imprisoned and it is also not correlated with any other factors
that could a⁄ect Pi; that is Cov(Releasedi;"i) = 0.
A concern related to the above assumption is that the share of inmates released may alter the costs
and the bene￿ts of criminal activities. If an increase in the number of inmates released correspond
33In particular, the maximum value for the fraction of rainy days (.88) is recorded by the homeless who spent 6 days
on the street. This is computed by dividing the total number of rainy days, 5.33 days (i.e. 2 days of rainfall recoded
in 6 weather stations - 2 days - plus 4 days of rainfall recorded in 5 out of 6 weather stations - 3.33 days) and the total
number of days spent on the street.
34As described in section 4, data on inmates released are available only from 1993 onwards. Hence, to the individuals
who became homeless before 1993 (9.7%), I impute the fraction of inmates released from January 1993 onwards.
23to an increase in the number of policemen or police expenditures, the likelihood of incarceration in
the structural equation (2) might be a⁄ected. To address this concern, I directly test for whether
increases in the number of inmates released are associated with the amount of police employed in
Milan. I ￿nd little evidence in support of this argument: the correlation between yearly data on police
enforcement in Milan from 1993 to 2000 (Barbaglio, 2000) with the number of inmates released from
Milan￿ s correctional facilities is equal to -.40 and reports a p-value of .28, thus increasing con￿dence
on the hypothesis that Releasedi is exogenous to Pi. In table 6 below (columns (1)-(4)) I also show
that the share of inmates released does not a⁄ect the network size, reducing concerns that the number
of released might in￿ uence the outcome variable not only through the share of criminal friends (￿);
but also through the network size (N).
Finally, an important data-related issue arises because we only observed individuals who were
homeless in a speci￿c date, when the survey was conducted. We do not observed criminal homeless
who were in jail during the survey. Our estimates are based on a stock of individuals who were
homeless on a particular date. This implies that the probability of being in the sample depends on the
time spent in the state, and it is therefore higher for individuals with longer homeless windows (length-
biased sampling) (Salant, 1977; Cameroon, Trivedi, 2005). High frequency criminal individuals
might be imprisoned more often, and, on average, might have smaller length of homeless spells.
As a consequence, they might be less likely to be represented in the stock population. Hence, our
estimates are based on a sample of less criminal individuals compared to the true population, with
a consequent downward bias compared to the true e⁄ect.
7 Results
7.1 Main results
The results reported in this section examine how the size of the social network and peer characteristics
in￿ uence the probability of imprisonment for the individual i during his period as homeless. In all
estimates, standard errors are robust and adjusted for clustering of the residuals at the place of
interview level (shelters, parks, streets, stations, etc.). Summary statistics on the variables used in
the regressions can be found in the Appendix Table A.1.
[Insert table 6]
Table 6 reports instrumental variable ￿rst stage estimates and reduced form results. I begin by
analyzing the impact of rainfall on the probability of incarceration. According to the estimates of
24column (1), the fraction of rainy days during i￿ s period on the street strongly and positively predicts
the size of the social network. During rainy days, the concentration of homeless people in sheltered
places (i.e. bridges, train stations, underground) is more likely to increase, with a consequent higher
probability of social interactions. In term of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the
fraction of rainy days during one￿ s period as homeless is associated with having 0.27 more friends.
The e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant at 1% level. In column 2, I include the instrument for the share
of criminal friends: while rainfall remains positive and statistically signi￿cant, Releasedi does not
in￿ uence the network size. This ￿nding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, such as
age, age squared, length of the homeless spell (in months), length squared (in months), gender,
education, nationality and a dummy indicating the place of the interview (column (3)). Holding the
other controls at the sample mean, one standard deviation increase in rainfall, increase the dependent
variable by 0.33 friends.
The positive coe¢ cient of the rainfall variable deserves further investigations. Column (4) report
an alternative speci￿cation of the variable describing rainfall variation. In particular, I study the
di⁄erent e⁄ects of rainfall, based on its quartiles￿distribution. I keep the same controls as in the
baseline speci￿cation in column (3). It is interesting to note an increasing and monotonic e⁄ect of
rainfall in predicting the number of friends. Being in the last quartile of the rainfall distribution
positively a⁄ects the dependent variable and the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant at 1% level. In
column (5), I further modify the rainfall variable by taking into consideration only the fraction of
rainy days during one￿ s ￿rst year on the street. This alternative speci￿cation takes into account a
greater degree of variation in rainfall during a shorter period of time and a potential greater level of
e⁄ort in searching homeless friends at the beginning of the homeless status. The fraction of rainy
days is still positive and statistically signi￿cant, but the coe¢ cient is slightly smaller in magnitude
compared to the one estimated in column (3).
Columns (6) and (7) of table 6 report the ￿rst stage results for the share of peers who went
to prison before being homeless on the fraction of inmates released by Milan￿ s authority during
one0s period as homeless. The mechanism behind this instrument is that exogenous policies driving
inmates￿out￿ ow a⁄ect the supply of criminal potential friends, increasing the likelihood to meet
homeless friends who already had previous criminal experience. According to the estimates in column
(7), ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of criminals released during i0s
homeless spell increases the the fraction of i0s peers who went to prison before being homeless by 3.9
percentage points. The Cragg-Donald test for weak instruments is above the critical value of 7.03
25(at 10% bias toleration) and 4.58 (at 15% bias toleration), suggesting that rainfall variation and the
fraction of inmates released could be considered valid instruments in this setting (Sock and Yogo,
2002).
In columns (8)-(9), I report the reduced form regressions. Looking at the reduced form equation
can further mitigate concerns about weak instruments (Angrist and Kruger, 2001). In almost all
cases, we note the expected signs of the coe¢ cients of interest and a statistically signi￿cant correlation
between the instruments and probability of incarceration.
[Insert table 7]
The main research question of the paper is to understand the role of peer characteristics and of
the network size on individual criminal decision. Table 7 reports second stage estimates where the
dependent variable is equal to one if homeless i has been arrested during his period as homeless.
Columns (1)-(3) show OLS results. According to the baseline estimate in column (1), the likelihood
to go to prison during homelessness decreases by 3.4 percentage points with one additional friend.
A plausible interpretation of this ￿nding is that friends represent a source of mutual insurance.
Homeless with more friends have greater chances to survive on the street without committing crimes
because their idiosyncratic shocks are shared among a higher number of individuals. An alternative
interpretation of the negative coe¢ cient on the network size could be that having more friends
reduces the probability of arrest, conditional on crime. This would be the case if, for example,
homeless with larger social networks would have a lower chance to be caught by the police - because
protected by a higher number of friends - compared to those with smaller or no networks. While
this reasoning could be true in some speci￿c contexts (the Italian Ma￿a is a well-known example), it
seems irrelevant among homeless people: they do not have credential to be trusted by the police and
no incentive to be involved in a trial as witnesses to protect a friend. The estimated peer e⁄ects, ￿;
are captured by the share of i￿ s friends who went to prison before becoming homeless. OLS estimates
in column (2) reveal the presence of peer e⁄ects in crime: the share of peers who served previous jail
sentence increases the likelihood that an individual, with no prior adjudication, will be arrested. The
coe¢ cient remains positive and highly signi￿cant with the inclusion of socio-demographic controls
and place of interview dummies (column (3)). The OLS estimates are consistent with the hypothesis
that the number of friends reduces the probability of imprisonment, while the share of criminal
friends increases it. However, these estimates might re￿ ect the e⁄ect of unobservables that might
simultaneously impact the likelihood to have many friends and to be arrested.
26Columns (4)-(6) contain the key results of this empirical section. They show IV estimates of the
probability of incarceration, by exploiting the fraction of rainy day in one￿ s period as homeless as
excluded instrument for the size of the network and the variation in the fraction of inmates released
for the share of one￿ s criminal peers. By looking at the speci￿cation with network size only (column
4), estimates con￿rm a negative and statistically signi￿cant correlation between the number of friends
and the likelihood of arrest. This result is robust to the inclusion of the variable describing the share of
criminal peers (column (5))35. In term of magnitude, one additional friend leads to a 16.2 percentage
points decrease in the probability of going to prison during an homeless spell. Controlling for the
endogeneity of ￿; estimates clearly indicate the presence of signi￿cant peer e⁄ects in the probability
of committing criminal activities: the exposure to a greater fraction of peers who served previous jail
sentence strongly increases the likelihood of committing illegal acts for an individual with no prior
criminal experience. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of peers who went to prison
before becoming homeless increases the probability that homeless i will go to prison by approximately
20 percentage points. The results hold also by including additional socio-demographic characteristics.
Recall that we include the dummy Prison
Before
i to gauge peer e⁄ects only on those individuals who
did not have prior criminal experience. The inclusion of Prison
Before
i ; length of the homeless spell
and length squared among the controls is important to increase the precision in the estimation of ￿
and ￿: However, the estimated coe¢ cients on these variables may su⁄er from endogeneity bias. For
this reason they should not be given a causal interpretation. The purpose of including them among
the controls is purely to test whether the correlation between incarceration and the number of friends
or the share of criminal peers is driven by prior criminal experience or by the length of the homeless
window. Note that by including a dummy for Italians, I attempt to control for a potential di⁄erent
cost of committing illegal acts for Italians and immigrants (i.e. immigrants might face a higher cost
of crime because it involves deportation).
[Insert table 8]
The main results reported in table 7 use only a single peer measure - the fraction of criminal
peers in the group. This naturally leads to the question of whether other measures of criminal
peers would reinforce or threaten peer e⁄ects. In table 8, I use as alternative endogenous variable:
a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports the name of at least one criminal peer.
35The results are robust to the alternative speci￿cation of rainfall variable used to estimates the ￿rst stage in table
6. When using the fraction of rainy days in the ￿rst year as homeless as excluded instrument, the coe¢ cient (standard
error) on the network size is equal to -0.101 (0.06).
27According to both OLS and IV estimates in columns (1) and (3), having at least one friend with
prior criminal experience still increases the probability of one￿ s incarceration, without a⁄ecting the
sign of the coe¢ cient on network size. Looking at the magnitude of the coe¢ cient in column 3, a
standard deviation increase in the one-criminal peer variable leads to a 21 percentage points increase
in the likelihood of arrest. The e⁄ect is very similar to the one estimated in the previous table. In
columns (2) and (4), I prove the robustness of OLS and IV estimates to a speci￿cation with controls.
The coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ maintain the same sign and remain statistically signi￿cant at 1% level.
Overall, the results in this section show that homeless individuals with many friends are less likely
to be arrested, presumably because of the presence of mutual insurance mechanisms, while having
friends with prior criminal experience increases the likelihood of imprisonment, probably due to an
information channel in acquiring information and criminal skills.
7.2 Interpretation
To have more insights on the relevance and the potential policy implications of these results, I
compute a simple exercise by comparing an increase in the network size by one extra criminal friend
versus one extra non-criminal friend, on the probability of imprisonment, given the average network
size and the average fraction of peers in prison before becoming homeless in the sample. The number
of criminal friends, Ni;CR is de￿ned in the model as a fraction ￿ of the total number of friends (Ni);
and it is equal to 0.14.36 First, let￿ s suppose to increase the network size by one additional non-
criminal friend, from 1.37 friends to 2.37 friends. The fraction ￿ of criminal peers will then decrease
from 0.102 to 0.058.37 The variation in the average share of criminal friends, with and without one
extra non-criminal friend is then equal to -0.044. Based on the coe¢ cients on the network size and
on the fraction of criminal peers estimated in table 7, we can now computing the probability of
arrest given an extra non-criminal friend. It turns out that, ceteris paribus, the probability of arrest
decreases with an extra non-criminal friend by approximately 19.9 percentage points.38
Second, we can do the same exercise by calculating the e⁄ect on the probability to go to prison
with one additional criminal friend. The network size increases again at 2.37 friends, but, in this
case, the number of criminal friends also increases from 0.14 to 1.14. The fraction of criminal friends
36By taking the share of peers in prison before being homeless and the average value of the total number of friends,
I ￿nd: Ni;CR = ￿Ni =0.10*1.37=0.14.
37The fraction of criminal peers is equal to: ￿ =
Ni;CR
Ni =0:14




one additional non-criminal friend.
38This result is obtained by substituiting the coe¢ cients on the network size, on the share of criminal peers and the
variation in the network size and in the fraction of criminal peers with an extra non criminal friend in equation (2):
Pi =1 (-0.162)+(-0.044) (0.854)=-0.199.
28￿ is then equal to 0.48.39 For the same reasoning, it turns out that an additional criminal friend
increases the likelihood of imprisonment by about 24.7 percentage points.40 This means that having
one additional criminal friend increases the probability to commit crime more, in absolute term,
than how a non-criminal friend decreases it. In reality, however, it is di¢ cult to distinguish ex-ante
between "criminal" and "non-criminal" types. To derive a more clear policy implications, it is useful
to compute the expected value of the probability to go to prison, by using as proxy for the probability
to be criminal, the average number of o⁄enders in the sample (29.6%). In conclusion, the expected
value of going to prison decreases by 7 percentage points with one additional friend, independently
by his or her criminal records before homelessness.41 This implies that boosting friendship would be
an important policy to reduce criminal behavior among the homeless.
8 Robustness
This section provides some further evidence of the robustness of the main ￿ndings. First, through
out the paper, I found a strong positive correlation between rainfall shocks and the number of friends.
The interpretation of this e⁄ect is that homeless individuals are more likely to interact during rainy
days because they are concentrated in sheltered places. Let￿ s assume now that the number of rainy
days have nothing to do with the network size and the e⁄ect that we have estimated is generated by
other sources of variation. To test this competing explanation, following De Giorgi et al. (2010), I
arti￿cially construct a random variable indicating the number of friends, with the same distribution
as the original network size variable. I expect to ￿nd no signi￿cant rainfall e⁄ect when the network
size is arti￿cially constructed. Column (1) in table A.2 in the Appendix shows that the fraction of
rainy days does not a⁄ect the arti￿cially constructed network size. Similarly, I generate a placebo
share of criminal peers, by arti￿cially and randomly assigning an hypothetical share of criminal
peers to each individual, distributed as the original variable. Column (2) in table A.2 reports no
statistically signi￿cant correlation between the fraction of inmates released and the random share of
criminal peers. As a second experiment, in column (3), I report second stage estimates of equation (2),
substituting the real network size and the real share of criminal peers with the arti￿cially constructed
ones. While the actual network size and the actual share of criminal friends respectively decreases
and increases the probability of incarceration, as shown in table 7, the random allocation of criminal
friends does not have any statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the dependent variable.




40The likelihood of imprisonment has been computed as follows: Pi=1(-0.162)+(0.48) (0.854)=0.247.
41The likelihood of imprisonment has been computed as follows: Pi = (0:296)0:247 + (1 ￿ 0:29)(￿0:199) = ￿0:07.
29Second, the e⁄ect of peer characteristics tested in the paper relies on the assumption that a
potential peer in￿ uences individual criminal behavior because his imprisonment happened before the
one of the respondent. In other words, to in￿ uence individual criminal behavior, friends must be
criminals before meeting individual i. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows all the possible scenarios for
the timing of imprisonment for individual i and a potential friend j. Peer exposure is clearly identi￿ed
in scenarios A and B, where peer￿ s imprisonment before becoming homeless happened before i0s
incarceration, independently on the date of arrival on the street for i and j. In scenario C, i became
homeless after j and, in principle, his incarceration should have happened before j￿ s incarceration.
But, since in equation (2) we are considering i￿ s imprisonment only during his homelessness and not
before, i0s period in prison cannot be, by construction, before j￿ s period in prison. Scenarios C is
therefore impossible. Scenario D could be the only case in which there will not be peer exposure
because i￿ s imprisonment happened before j￿ s incarceration. However, since we are considering only
homeless peers, if i met j before j has become homeless, this peer would not be in the sample. On the
other hand, by instrumenting the share of criminal friends, I address the reverse causality problem
if i met j after j has become homeless.
These examples provide further con￿dence that the results presented in the previous section are
driven by peer exposure.
9 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the in￿ uence of peers during a period of homelessness on each other￿ s subsequent
criminal behavior. The paper makes two main contributions. First, the data used come from the ￿rst
representative survey in Europe among the homeless, conducted by the author in January 2008 in
Milan, Italy. While prior empirical literature, studying peer e⁄ects on individual decisions, identi￿es
peers at aggregate level, this survey elicits information on friends￿names which allows me to precisely
map each respondent￿ s network. Second, to control for the non-random matching of individuals to
their peers, the paper applies an instrumental variable strategy by exploiting rainfall variation to
instrument the size of the network in one￿ s period as homeless, and variation in the inmates released
by Milan￿ s authorities to proxy the fraction of criminal friends in the network.
The results provide strong evidence of peer e⁄ects in the realm of criminality among homeless
individuals. Speci￿cally, the individual probability of being arrested, for individuals with no prior
criminal experience, increases with the exposure to peers with a history of criminal records. However,
the same probability decreases as the total number of homeless friends (criminal and non-criminal)
30increases. These ￿ndings are robust to di⁄erent identi￿cation strategies.
While the empirical analysis do not attempt to explicitly distinguish between potential channels
through which peers with criminal records a⁄ect the individual probability of imprisonment and why
homeless individuals with more friends are less likely to go to prison, anecdotal evidence collected
among homeless people might provide some insights on the underlining mechanisms. Criminal peers
seem mainly to increase knowledge about how and where to commit crimes, thereby decreasing the
perceived costs and increasing the potential returns from committing crimes. Contrarily, the total
number of friends acts as a safety net for people living on the street. Homeless people are constantly
hit by idiosyncratic shocks and they develop mechanisms of informal insurance with friends to smooth
shocks and to guarantee their survival on the street.
These results have relevant implications from a policy perspective. The negative correlation
between the size of social networks and crime may provide an incentive to policy makers to boost
social interactions among the homeless society. For instance, drop-in day centers that o⁄er social
activities for homeless people such as board games, group conversations, movies, may be bene￿cial
for stimulating social interactions and reducing criminal activities. On the other hand, the existence
of peer e⁄ects on criminal behaviors suggests that any reduction in the criminal histories of peers
would lead to further reductions in crime. Hence, programs targeting rehabilitation in prison and
housing assistance after release might have bene￿cial spillover from the reduction of former inmates
who might become homeless and, consequently, reduce crime propagation.
Could these results and policies be extended to other settings or population? Given the recent
increasing trend in the homelessness rates, as one of the main consequence of the economic crisis,
and the new pro￿le of a homeless person, researchers should carefully re￿ ect on the thin line between
urban poor and homeless people. Certainly, they are the most vulnerable population in richer
countries, characterized by a high degree of social interactions and a high share of former inmates.
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of street homeless and shelters’ locations. Milan, January 2008 
 
 
   Legend:  : [] = Location of street homeless: 1 dot equals to 1 homeless. 
  [  ] = Location of shelters: 1 dot equals to 10 homeless. 





Figure 2: Date of first arrival on the street/shelter 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Date of arrival on the street/shelter 




Source: Regional Agency for the Environmental Protection and the Meteorological Department of the Military Aeronautics for rainfall data, 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the homeless count. Milan, January 2008 
          
   Street Shelter  Slums 
N. of homeless counted  408  1152  2300 
N. of homeless sampled  408  500  525 
% of homeless 
Interviewed 34.60  84.00  66.50 
Who refused  11.98  2.00  -- 
Not found  21.00  6.69  33.50 
Not interviewed due to time constraint  0.00  7.30   -- 
Who were sleeping  16.40   --   -- 
Not interviewed because we did not send 
enumerators 
16.00   --   -- 
With bad quality questionnaires  0.02  0.01   -- 
Observations 141  420  349 







Table 2: Fraction of homeless who declared an income, by source 
                 
First source of income  All sample  Street  Shelter   Italians  Immigrants 
No income  13.01  7.09  15  9.24  16.03 
Government subsidies
a 13.59  12.06 21.43  38.15  3.84 
Permanent/Occasional work/Savings 31.90  26.24 34.51  25.71  37.82 
Family/Relatives 5.53  5.67  5.48  4.02  6.73 
Friends 5.53  8.51  4.52  2.81  7.69 
Shelter subsidy/Church/Associations 2.32  2.13  2.38  2  2.56 
Illegal activities  1.07  0.71 1.19  1.2  0.96 
Don't know/Don't answer  20.31  37.59 15.47  16.87  24.36 
Observations 561  141  420  249  312 
Notes: (a) Government subsidies include welfare checks, unemployment benefits, disability insurance, pension. To be eligible for 
welfare checks it is required to be Italian and to be resident in Italy. Regular immigrants can benefit from disability/unemployment 
insurance and pension if they meet the eligibility requirements. The survey also investigates the second and the third source of income. 
As second source, 5.27% declares income from family and friends, 4.64% from work,  1.47% from  government subsidies,  1.26% 
from illegal activities, 0.21% from begging, 0.21% from shelter subsidies, 0.84%  church and voluntary organization. The 98.5% of the 
















Table 3: Fraction of homeless who have been in prison, by nationality 
                   
All sample  Italians  Immigrants 
   Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent 
Prison at least once  162  29.62  95  38.15  67  21.47 
       Prison only before homelessness  50  9.14  31  12.76  19  6.25 
       Prison before and during homelessness 10  1.83  6  2.47  4  1.32 
       Prison only during homelessness  102  18.65  58  23.87  44  14.47 
Never in prison  385  70.38  148  59.44  237  75.96 
Don't  answer  14 2.5  6 2.41 8 2.56 
Total  561 100 249 100 312 100 
Source: Author's calculations on the MHS, 2008. Notes: Before and during homelessness means before and after the first night an 












Table 4: Distribution of friends, by place of interview and incarceration (%) 
              
Distribution of friends  All Sample  Street Shelter  Sample of Inmates
a 
      In prison before 
homelessness 
In prison during 
homelessness 
0 friends  36.19  28.37 38.81  33.33  50.00 
At least 1 friend  52.40  56.03 51.19  53.34  41.96 
1 friend  21.03  20.57 21.19  20.00  16.96 
2 friends  13.19  16.31 12.14  11.67  10.71 
3 friends  5.88  6.38  5.71  6.67  7.14 
4 friends  6.24  7.09  5.95  10.00  5.36 
5 friends  6.06  5.67  6.19  5.00  1.79 
Don't know/ Don't answer  11.41  15.60 10.00  13.33  8.04 
Mean 1.35  1.5  1.3  1.46  1.01 
Observations 561  141  420  60  112 












Table 5: Share of i's peers who have been in prison before homelessness (%) 
                 
Share of peers in prison  
before homelessness
(a) 
All Sample  Street  Shelter Sample of Inmates
a 
   In prison before 
homelessness 
In prison during 
homelessness 
0 
(b)  69.16 64.54  70.71  63.33  63.39 
At least one peer in prison 
before homelessness 
11.59 14.89  10.48  21.67  25.9 
0.25 0.89  0.71  0.95  3.33  0.89 
0.33 1.25  2.13  0.95  1.67  0.89 
0.5 3.03  4.26  2.62  6.67  7.14 
0.666 1.25  2.13  1.43  1.67  4.46 
1  5.17 5.67  5.00  8.33  14.29 
No peers interviewed/don't 
answer 
19.25 20.57  18.81  15.0  10.71 
Mean  0.10 0.121  0.093  0.15  0.21 
Observations 561  141  420  60  112 
Source: Author’s calculation on the MHS 2008. Notes: (a) The share of i's peers is computed among the sample of homeless interviewed; (b) The share of 








Table 6: The effect of rainfall on network size and of inmates released on the share of criminal peers 
                             
First Stage     Reduced Form 
Dependent Variable=  Network size (number of best friends)  Share of i’s peers in prison 
before homelessness 
1 if  i has been in prison 
during homelessness 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Raini 2.049*** 2.218***  2.564***      0.121  0.130  -0.253***  -0.026 
  [0.564]  [0.646] [0.722]      [0.087] [0.095] [0.058] [0.068] 
Releasedi   0.012  0.018  -0.005  0.012  0.008***  0.008***  0.005  0.016*** 
  [0.011]  [0.013] [0.013] [0.012]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
Raini: 2° quartile         0.117             
        [0.177]             
Raini: 3° quartile         0.423**             
        [0.217]             
Raini: 4° quartile         0.493**             
        [0.178]             
Raini during the first year        2.062***          
      [0.629]           
Controls
a no  no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Place of interview dummy
b no  no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
R-sq.   0.48  0.48  0.49  0.48  0.48  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.09 
Shea Partial R-sq.  0.03  0.03  0.03   0.02   0.01  0.02  0.03    --   -- 
F-test  13.19  6.94  6.93  3.65  5.88  8.03  4.54    --   -- 
Cragg-Donald test  17.30  14.29  9.17  8.20  9.69  14.29  9.17    --   -- 
Observations 535  535  535  535  535  535  535  535  535 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering at the place of the interview level (each shelter 
or street area). Network size is the total number of direct friends and it varies between 0 and 5. Raini is the fraction of rainy days in one's period as homeless  and it is computed as the total number of 
rainy days in one's period as homeless out of the total number of days as homeless. Releasedi is the fraction of inmates released by Milan's authorities during one's period as homeless. (a) Controls 
include a dummy equal 1 if homeless i went to prison before becoming homeless, age, age squared, length of the homeless spell (in months), length squared (in months), gender, education and a dummy 
equal to one if i is Italian. (b) A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed on the street, 0 if in a shelter.  
Table 7: Network size, criminal peers and the probability of imprisonment 
 
        
Dependent Variable.: 1 if  has been in prison during homelessness    
 OLS  IV  Estimates 
   (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Network size  -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.159*** -0.162***  -0.127** 
  [0.009]  [0.009] [0.008] [0.041] [0.035]  [0.055] 
Share of i’s peers in Prison 
before homelessness 
0.445*** 0.484***   0.854* 2.262*** 
[0.108] [0.111]   [0.471] [0.673] 
Prisoni 
Before   -0.107*     -0.213** 
   [0.049]      [0.112] 
Age   0.001      0.008 
   [0.006]      [0.008] 
Age sq.    0.000      -0.000 
   [0.000]      [0.000] 
Length of homeless spell 
(months) 
 0.002***     0.002*** 
 [0.001]     [0.000] 
Lengh sq.
 (months)   -0.000**      -0.000*** 
   [0.000]      [0.000] 
Female   -0.091*      -0.101 
   [0.054]      [0.072] 
Years of education    0.005      0.005 
   [0.004]      [0.005] 
Italian   0.053      0.021 
   [0.048]      [0.045] 
Place of interview dummy 
(a) no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
R-squared 0.02  0.09  0.16  0.03 0.13  0.17 
F-test 1° stage I  ---  ---  ---  13.19  6.94        6.93 
F-test 1° stage II  --- ---  --- ---  8.03  4.54 
Cragg-Donald test  --- ---  ---  17.30  14.29  9.17 
Observations 547  547  535  535  535  535 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering  
at the place of the interview level (each shelter or street area). Network size is the total number of direct friends and it varies between 0 and 5. Raini is the 
fraction of rainy days in one's period as homeless  and it is computed as the total number of rainy days in one's period as homeless out of the total number of 
days as homeless. Releasedi is the fraction of inmates released by Milan's authorities during one's period as homeless. Controls include a dummy equal 1 if 
homeless i went to prison before becoming homeless, age, age squared, length of the homeless spell (in months), length squared (in months), gender, 
education and a dummy equal to one if i is Italian. (a) A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed on the street, 0 if in a shelter.  
 
Table 8: Network size, criminal peers and the probability of imprisonment: alternative measure 
of criminal peers 
 
  
Dependent Variable.: 1 if  has been in prison during homelessness 
  OLS IV  Estimates 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Network size  -0.057*** -0.058***  -0.173***  -0.112*** 
[0.009] [0.008]  [0.032]  [0.043] 
At least one peer in Prison 
before homelessness 
0.343*** 0.378***  0.689*  1.748*** 
[0.068] [0.074]  [0.397]  [0.448] 
Prisoni 
Before -0.113**  -0.254*** 
[0.052] [0.104] 
Age 0.0001  0.001 
[0.006] [0.007] 
Age sq.  0.000  0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] 





  (months)  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Female -0.091  -0.097 
[0.056] [0.083] 
Years of education  0.005  0.006 
[0.004] [0.005] 
Italian 0.045  -0.014 
[0.050] [0.054] 
Place of interview dummy 
a  no      yes  no      yes 
R-squared 0.09  0.16  0.12  0.31 
F-test 1° stage I  ---  ---  7.32  5.50 
F-test 1° stage II  ---  ---  11.70  5.94 
Cragg-Donald test  ---  ---  16.47  9.12 
Observations 547  535  535  535 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering of the residuals at the place of the interview (name of the shelter/street). 
Constant not displayed. Network Size is the total number of direct friends and it varies between 0 and 5. Prison Beforei 
is a dummy variable equal to one if homeless i has been in prison before the beginning of his homeless spell. (a) A 
dummy equal to one if the respondent was interviewed on the street, 0 if in a shelter. Columns 1-2 report OLS 
estimates, columns 3-4 show instrumental variable coefficients. Excluded instrument for the network size is the 
fraction of rainy days in i's homeless spell. Excluded instrument for having at least one criminal friend is the fraction 
of inmates released during one’s period as homeless.  
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Figure A.1: Peer exposure 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics 
                 
Variable    Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Prisoni 547  0.204  0.403  0  1 
Network Size   547  1.37  1.47  0  5 
Share of i's peer in prison before 
homelessness 
(a) 
547 0.10  0.24  0  1 
At least 1 peer in prison 547  0.14  0.31  0  1 
Raini 535  0.22  0.13  0.16  0.88 
Raini during the first year   535  0.13  0.16  0.00  0.88 
Releasedi  535 8.87  4.89  1.56  21.06 
Prisoni
Before 547  0.10  0.31  0  1 
Female 547  0.142  0.349  0  1 
Age 547  44.68  13.35  19  82 
Age sq.   547  2174.7  1233.1  361  6724 
Years of educ.  547  9.12  4.08  0  20 
Length of homeless spell (months)  535  107.80     167.75  0.5  582.5 
Length of homeless spell sq. (months)  535  39710.6 97788.35 0.25  339306.3 
Source: Author's calculation on the MHS 2008. Notes: Raini is the fraction of rainy days in one's period as homeless  and it is computed as the total 
number of rainy days in one's period as homeless out of the total number of days as homeless. Releasedi is the fraction of inmates released by 
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Table A.2: Robustness checks: random network size and random share of criminal peers 
        
  First Stage  Second Stage  
Dependent Variable:  Random Network size  Random Share of i’s 
peers in prison before 
homelessness 
1 if i has been in 
prison during 
homelessness 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Fraction of rainy daysi 0.188  -0.001   
 [0.664]  [0.096]   
Fraction of inmates released 
during  i’s homeless spell 
-0.0323 -0.001   
[0.015] [0.002]   
Random network size      -0.137 
     [0.008] 
Random share of i's peers in 
prison before homelessness 
   0.056 
      [0.062] 
Controls yes  yes  yes 
Place of interview dummy
a yes  yes  yes 
R-sq. 0.03  0.007  0.07 
Shea Partial R-sq.  0.003  0.002  -- 
F-test 2.63  1.78  -- 
Cragg-Donald test  1.36  0.94  -- 
Observations 535  535  535 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted 
for clustering  at the place of the interview level. Controls include a dummy equal 1 if homeless i went to prison before he became homeless, 
age, age squared, duration of an homeless spell (in months), duration squared (in months), gender, education and a dummy equal to one if i is 
Italian, month of entry in the homeless window. (a) A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed on the street, 0 if in a shelter. 